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HOLINESS IN EXCESS: BETWEEN HOLINESS 




Rowan Williams has consistently given expression to Christian faith in surprising and genera-
tive ways, especially through the language of ‘excess’ and through contemplating the excess in 
the narrative and identity of Christ. By attending to the grammar of excess, this essay draws out 
elements of the metaphysics of holiness in dialogue with Williams. I ask how creaturely being 
can be sustained by the holiness which generates all things without leaving holiness so ubiq-
uitous as to be either trivial or hidden. I respond to this problem by arguing that holy lives and 
communities make visible the ontological dependence of all things on God. Finally, this pro-
vides a way of recognizing the value of the metaphysical imagination in the pursuit of holiness.
To see a glorious fountain and an end,
To see all creatures tend
To thy advancement, and so sweetly close
In thy repose: to see them shine
In use, in worth, in service, and even foes
Among the rest made thine:
To see all these unite at once in thee
Is to behold felicity.
 –Thomas Traherne1
Metaphysics, we have been told, begins in wonder. It is consequently basic to the task of 
metaphysics—to thinking the real—that we are attentive to the wonders around us. And if this 
is the case, then perhaps the ordinary stuff of the Christian life is more relevant to metaphysics 
than we might otherwise assume. For what could incite more wonder than the possibility that 
humans could become holy? That the uncontainable and unimaginable God could be imaged 
through simple human lives?
In his Phaedo, Plato invites us to imagine ourselves as small frogs peering into a pond, as 
if the whole of our sensory experience is but a puddle on the surface of the real.2 The world 
we inhabit is simply surface, a rippling and refracting interplay of appearances—shimmering 
with a depth not its own. One way of taking this image is consonant with a Christian vision of 
creation in which creation is on one plane of existence that is inherently dependent on a being 
ontologically other, from whom it receives existence.3 Through the created play of surfaces, 
we encounter a generative depth wholly present to, though not exhausted by, finite exteriority.
The task of metaphysics draws one to contemplate surfaces in thinking the real. One funda-
mental aspect, then, concerns how to negotiate this movement from surface to ‘real’. Does the 
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movement involve a progression from one discrete grade of reality to another ‘higher’ grade, as 
in a strong dualism between the sensible and the intelligible? Or is the movement a judgment—
already noetic and ontic4—by which one discerns the reality in and of the surface itself—in 
Erich Przywara’s phrase, the ‘essence in-and-beyond existence’?5 Any activity of metaphys-
ics requires some judgment concerning the reality of the surface or sensible appearances we 
navigate and what the most general categories are for such judgments.6 This does not mean an 
epistemological foundation is needed for metaphysics; rather the judgment is simultaneously 
both noetic and ontic, as the ‘duality … between the act of knowledge and the object of knowl-
edge … leaves open no possibility of a retreat on the part of either into the enclosure of its own 
“purity”. The meta-noetic transcends itself, in a forward intentionality, towards the meta-ontic. 
The meta-ontic moves backward in self-critique, reflexively, towards the meta-noetic.’7 There is 
no privileging of one’s own intellectual act over-against encountering the other, for our knowing 
is consistently unsettled and revised in traversing the real.
To say that we are always involved in judgments concerning the reality of things is to impli-
cate all human activity in metaphysics. Rowan Williams expresses the relationship of the pro-
cess of forming judgments and the task of metaphysics this way:
The authentically political, the project of continually challenging localised and incommu-
nicable discourses about human interest, arises out of a commitment to thought in a certain 
mode, thought aware of its own production, its own vulnerability and its own commitment to 
risk. This carries an account of reality-as-such, not in the sense of talk of unreal objects or 
invisible but discussable entities, but in the sense that it uncovers what we cannot but do if we 
are concerned with truthfulness. A negative metaphysic, comparable to a negative theology? 
Perhaps … But a metaphysic undoubtedly, and so too an ethic for both thinking and acting.8
Because thinking requires vulnerability to error and revision, and so holding tentative all judg-
ments concerning the other, so too our thinking is involved in ‘an account of reality-as-such’—a 
reality not wholly subject to the individual will—the recognition of which further requires con-
sideration of how one ought to think and act, and, hence, it also involves an ethic.
As both Williams and Erich Przywara recognize, this kind of metaphysic requires analogy. 
Analogy, in the form of the analogia entis, is the metaphysic insofar as it regulates the noetic 
and the ontic. In an essay discussing the relation of Barth and Hegel, Williams concludes with 
a brief presentation of Przywara as a way forward, and it is precisely because in Przywara 
analogy moves beyond dialectic. Dialectic, as it is in different ways present in both Barth and 
Hegel, presents a tension within difference—whether between one and the other, thought and 
its other, or God and creation—a tension that ‘threatens to collapse into an ultimate self-identity 
(however drawing on Gillian Rose and Andrew Shanks, Williams argues that this is ultimately a 
flawed reading of Hegel).9 Analogy, by contrast, draws us into the ‘between’ that is suspended 
within the tension, so that thought and the negotiation of difference happens within the excess 
of being, within the interval between being and otherness, being and non-being, God and cre-
ation, and so without any collapse into identity or contradiction:
God is never exhaustively the other of creation. God is God, the identity of essence and ex-
istence, … in a mode of being radically inaccessible to finite conceptuality, defined by the 
internal differentiation of the Trinity. His being is thus outside any process of measurement 
or proportion; by the sheer gift simultaneously of existence and intelligible form to the finite, 
God establishes a world in which tension is inbuilt in our apprehension and thus ‘analogical’ 
thinking becomes of central importance. It is both a connecting mode of thought and one that 
connects to the infinite source, tracing the critical reality of unity in difference between finite 
things and between all finitude and God.10
918   JONATHAN M. PLATTER
Analogy, then, is linguistic—allowing for the stretching of words across differences without uni-
vocity or equivocity—and metaphysical. Przywara argues that analogy occurs between imma-
nent differences—ἀνά-λογον—and between the Creator-creature difference—ἄνω-λογον.11 
Analogy is a ‘coordinated relation’ rather than pure identity or pure contradiction; so while 
analogy acknowledges the tension-in-difference found in dialectic, it also avoids a dialectical 
collapse by being suspended within or between the tension.12
Communities committed to the memory and formation of holy lives have a special stake in 
this analogical apprehension of being; for not only are they involved in particular patterns of 
negotiation, with attendant vulnerabilities and risks, they are also directly concerned with the 
depth which suspends all finite surfaces in existence and the possibility that human persons 
might uniquely come to recognize and make visible this transcendent depth. In other words, for 
Christian holiness, both the ἀνά and the ἄνω of Przywara’s analogy are of explicit concern—
the church exists within the analogical intersection of the horizontal and vertical analogies. 
Consequently, thinking holiness entails reflecting on (I) the patterns of negotiation according 
to which the Holy is apprehended (goodness), (II) the recognition of the Holy as the transcen-
dent depth sustaining all finite being (truth), and (III) the concrete vocations by which holiness 
is made visible in human lives and communities (beauty). However, this basic framing of the 
question of holiness may seem to be involved in a problem: if all finite reality is always-already 
suspended by its transcendent origin and end—by Holiness-itself—it seems holiness is ubiq-
uitous and so either a trivial given or an ineffable mystery of existence. In other words, either 
holiness is so visible as to be unremarkable, or it is so invisible as to be irrelevant. In one sense 
this falls within the question of nature and grace, though it merits attention on its own insofar 
as it is not solely concerned with how grace fulfils nature but with the visibility and recognition 
of the grace of divine holiness within creaturely being—i.e., with what visible difference grace 
makes in nature. I will argue that by thinking holiness with Rowan Williams, it is possible to 
sustain a robust metaphysic in the broad Christian-Platonist tradition and understand holiness as 
(analogically) present in all things yet still eliciting visible witness in particular lives.13 Finally, 
I argue that this provides a way of recognizing the value of the metaphysical imagination in 
the pursuit of holiness. By ‘metaphysical imagination’ I do not refer only or primarily to the 
explicit academic study of metaphysics, but rather to the contemplation of all things through the 
‘transcendentals’, the most general categories of being—namely goodness, truth, and beauty.
I. THE GOODNESS OF HOLINESS
As my concern here is the negotiation, recognition, and visibility of holiness in Christian com-
munities, the pattern of this negotiation is determined by a particular narrative, for the central 
confession of Christianity is that in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ the church 
receives its form of life. The church is ‘a distinctive social body given coherence by the action 
of God in Jesus’.14 In Alasdair MacIntyre’s sense of tradition as a temporally extended argu-
ment,15 the church is a traditioned community—or a community of memory16—whose argu-
ment is that creaturely being is fulfilled and made intelligible by the narrative and identity of 
Christ. Consequently, the first-order business of the church is to learn to recognize Christ and 
the ways in which he, on the one hand, is a disruption of the patterns of being typical of this 
world and, on the other, is in fact identified with God—‘the radical creative energy that gener-
ates all things’.17 Insofar as Christ is a disruption of our typical patterns, he exposes that which 
occludes the holiness in all things; insofar as Christ is identified with the generative source of 
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all, he opens a way of being—not destroying but fulfilling nature—by which holiness might be 
made visible.
These two moments, of disruption and divine identification, coalesce in Christ’s appearance 
as the victim who is vindicated. In the victimization of Christ, the distorting practices of oppres-
sion are revealed by the reversal Christ effects: ‘grace is released when the judges turn to their 
victim [Jesus] and recognize him as their hope and their saviour’.18 So Christ, by disrupting 
destructive practices of violence and victimization as the particular victim of these practices, at 
the same time discloses the goal of human life from and beyond these distortions. In this way, 
the narrative of Christ shows nature to be not only permeated by the holiness that sustains it but 
also as antagonizing and obscuring that holiness. Consequently, finite being is recognized as at 
an analogical distance from God, so that its intimacy to God as creator does not entail a direct 
correspondence or identical repetition.
The Christian community negotiates this analogical distance in a trusting instability: for 
faithfully drawing towards divine goodness involves trust in God and ongoing vulnerability to 
the judgment of Christ. It involves a moral vulnerability by which we learn to remember rightly 
the failures of this community, attending to the victims of our failings through whom Christ 
utters judgment and hope.19 So the church practices repentance in order to acknowledge guilt in 
the creation of victims and to pursue life beyond the patterns of oppressive relations, to be made 
open to new patterns. The church consists in one moral perception: that God’s life is faithfully 
enacted in Jesus of Nazareth, who cannot be known apart from continued acts of trust and dis-
possession. Here is the center of the church’s ‘negative metaphysic’, summed in its orientation 
to the good embodied in Jesus. It consists in a commitment to surrendering to a being outside 
our grasp yet available to our continued pursuit; Christ cannot be reduced to surface data, as 
if he were simply a set of givens at our disposal, and in this sense his life and story evince an 
excess—his life is a signum—through which we are drawn into the generativity of the God who 
is source of all.20 In Jesus we see the good to which all creation finds proper orientation: ‘the 
Jesus who is here preached as sole source of salvation is the particular victim of that court. If 
any insight may be generalized out of this saying, it is that salvation does not bypass the history 
and memory of guilt, but rather builds upon and from it’.21 Williams might be taken here as 
glossing the Thomistic adage: grace (salvation) does not destroy nature (bypass the history and 
memory of guilt), but presupposes (builds from) and perfects (builds upon) it. Sanctification, 
then, takes time, as it is suspended within the analogical tension between trusting pursuit of 
Christ and vulnerability to the judgment of Christ in the other, between the history and memory 
of guilt and the salvation Christ offers from and upon it. And so, to reformulate Williams, in 
Christ we are confronted with ‘what we cannot but do if we are concerned with [goodness]’.22
II. THE TRUTH OF HOLINESS
To carry on in such a way about the destabilizing role of Christ in the metaphysical appre-
hension of goodness is, of course, already to be involved in a judgment about the truthfulness 
of Christ in relation to God as goodness. While this might seem circular, the judgment is not 
viciously circular insofar as it is primarily negative; it is to recognize Christ not as a meta-
physical posit which then provides the foundation for moral claims but rather as the personal 
centre of ongoing confrontation eliciting revisions and adjustments in moral judgments—as 
something ‘real’ but not a bounded item among the series of finite particulars. So, to recognize 
the moral centrality of Christ is to be involved in a judgment about truth but not necessarily to 
presuppose a truth-claim as the foundation for the moral development of Christian sanctity. For 
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to pursue the goodness revealed in Christ is just as much (or more) to pursue the truth to which 
he calls as it is to presume Christ truthfully mediates goodness.
This is in part just to concede that recognizing the truth of holiness is already a moral task, 
one which explicitly involves the subject in a process of dispossession and transformation—or 
a process of prayer. And this is, once again, rooted in Jesus, who ‘is active as bestower of the 
“spirit” that enables us to relate to God as he did; he is the cause of the fact that we can pray as 
we do (as he did)… Attention to or openness to his presence (faith?) makes possible the receiv-
ing of new kinds of prayer and awareness of, or confidence in, God as a gift.’23 A little later 
Williams continues, ‘[Jesus] continues to give shape and definition to the act of God initiated 
in the history of Israel and in his ministry. He is, so to speak, “held” in the divine action, his 
identity and human priorities … becoming the channel for God’s work of reconciliation.’24 It is 
fitting, then, that Williams characterizes the life of discipleship as ‘letting Christ’s action come 
through us as the Father’s act comes through him. … our discipleship in the company of Jesus 
is a trinitarian mode of life, embedded in the relationship of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit: that is, it is a contemplative mode of life.’25 Discipleship—life committed to the memory 
and formation of holiness—is constituted by disponibility to God’s action and by attention to 
God and God’s involvement with creation.
Sanctification as knowing the truth of God is not simply mediated by Christ, if that entails 
a transfer from one entity to another by means of a third; rather, the holy, contemplative life 
by which one comes to know God is Jesus’ life (his life being fully divine and fully human), 
made available to creaturely participation.26 This helps to qualify the sense in which Christ is 
a disruption in our ways of being: Christ disrupts through intimate involvement with the object 
of God’s delight, not because creation is so averse to the divine that it requires an overhaul. It is 
because God delights in creation—and so because something in creation gives faithful (truthful) 
expression to God’s own goodness and beauty—that God is deeply involved in the brokenness 
and hurt.27
Attending to the truth requires the practice and recovery of memory, because the self is 
made; the self is ‘what the past is doing now, it is the process in which a particular set of “given” 
events and processes and options crystalizes now in a new set of particular options, responses 
and determinations, providing a resource of given past-ness out of which the next decision and 
action can flow.’28 In turn, ‘God is the agency that gives us back our memories, because God is 
the “presence” to which all reality is present.’29 Becoming truthful selves, then, is to be related 
to the truth itself. Such a relation to God as truth does not secure for oneself a stable and secured 
status, free of potential error and misunderstanding. On the contrary, it is to be made vulnerable 
to the strangeness of all surfaces and to the excess generativity that sustains and unsettles them, 
to become, in Charles Taylor’s terms, a ‘porous’ rather than ‘buffered’ self.30 It is to recognize 
the surface of one’s own very self and to perceive God as the unsettling centre—who is more 
interior to me than I am to myself—who directs me outside myself—as more ‘superior’ and 
beyond myself.31 Being related to God as truth draws one into a rhythm, a surface oscillating 
between God interior to God beyond. In the task of seeking the God of truth, one is constantly 
being made strange to oneself, and yet it is this very strangeness which opens oneself to a 
deeper involvement and appreciation of the world of which we are members. In other words, it 
is the strangeness of temporal being, the possibility of becoming by encountering the strange 
excess of finitude as potentiality.32 And so ‘knowing God’ is not a matter of grasping with a 
closed and sealed hand, as Gregory of Nyssa rejected in the Stoics and Eunomius, but rather the 
vulnerability of being grasped by God.33
The memory and formation of holiness entails a commitment to a particular way of being 
in and perceiving the world. Holy vision resists an epistemological closure, but not because 
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all judgments are invalid. For to take this view would be to assume a strict divide between the 
knower and the known, or between language and reality, which would involve the problematic 
and question-begging premise that one knows both that there is such an absolute divide ‘in 
reality’ and that all language and knowledge necessarily fails to refer beyond this divide. By 
contrast, the holy resistance of closure is an apophatic posture, attending to the excess in all 
surfaces—it is the acknowledgement that all judgments are provisional because incomplete, not 
erroneous by necessity.34 And it is, further, the acknowledgement that truth is not a point of sta-
sis but a relation of intimacy between creature and creator, a relation marked on the creaturely 
side by the ongoing temporal openness of finitude35 and marked on the divine side by infinite 
plenitude and generativity.36 Holiness in this perspective is learning to speak and live truthfully 
in response to the divine excess by whom all things remain in being—to know how to ‘go on’ 
faithfully in the wake of the brokenness in the world.37 While never able to attain closure on the 
infinite holiness of God, holiness nevertheless continually hazards a wording and performing of 
the divine, for to do otherwise would simply be to resist responding to the call of divine beauty. 
The apophatic search for the apprehension of holiness is ‘what we cannot but do if we are con-
cerned with truthfulness’.38
III. THE BEAUTY OF HOLINESS
This discussion has already hinted now at that which precedes any acting and knowing—pre-
cedes, in a sense, goodness and truth—as that which elicits and calls forth response. Hence, I 
could have led with beauty, rather than culminating with it, for, as Hans Urs von Balthasar has 
expressed it, goodness and reason are always-already involved in being enraptured and seeing 
the form, insofar as they are tasks pursued in response to the call of beauty.39 And yet, beauty 
is also the culmination of sanctification, for only through the moral and rational transformation 
of discipleship can one’s vision be properly attuned to the beauty of creation and of God’s own 
holiness.
Beauty, in this light, forms two poles between which finite being is once again suspended, 
responding to and culminating in the divine claritas, and this suspension might once again be 
seen as pointing to the temporality of creaturely being. Art, as Williams argues in Grace and 
Necessity, involves us in a way of reading the world as if ‘things are not only what they are’ 
and ‘give more than they have’,40 and so it involves us in a way of taking time with creation in 
order to recognize and develop linguistic re-presentations of the excesses in the world. Art is 
consequently analogous to and compatible with the theologian’s task of articulating all things 
sub specie aeternitatis. And further this understanding of art permits a metaphysic according 
to which ‘the agency or energy of this particular bit of the environment’ can be fused ‘with my 
own agency, allowing the external stimulus to shape my action, yet also shaping the stimulus 
in particular ways as I make it my own’.41 So all things exhibit a communicative excess, which 
permits and elicits representations and responses, linguistic and otherwise. It is this excess that 
opens the possibility of re-presenting holiness—making divine generativity visible in concrete 
speech and actions.42 Representing holiness, in this manner, is to attempt love, self-dispossess-
ing and disinterested love—a love that, by virtue of its self-dispossessing character, is produc-
tive, ‘making other’ through giving more than it has.43
This is to say that being holy is to participate in divine generativity—a generativity that gives 
in a way that enables unique, though unnecessary, response; a generativity oriented to the triune 
abundance; a generativity so inexhaustible it can risk otherness and vulnerability, risk under-
going the victimizing structures of human life, risk the ‘weakness’ of forgiveness, and finally 
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risk being repeated and re-presented diversely. Consequently, a holy person ‘enlarges the world 
rather than shrinking it’,44 and so holiness is not first about becoming holy but about pursuing 
habits and practices that enable one to attend to the holiness visible in all things. Which finally 
allows us to see that the visible beauty of holiness is also involved in a certain instability insofar 
as holiness is made visible in lives which seek not to be the visibility of holiness but to recog-
nize and delight in it,45 and so becoming holy is sought through deferral—pursuing holiness 
is to turn one’s attention away from one’s own status and instead attend to holiness in others. 
Consequently, making holiness visible is a kind of ‘making other’—in analogy to the produc-
tion of art—through which the surfaces of finite being are made strange—other than familiar—
so that the excess of divine generativity, by which all things are sustained and pervaded, shines 
forth. Becoming holy by attending to the holiness in all things is ‘what we cannot but do if we 
are concerned with [beauty]’.46
IV. HOLINESS IN EXCESS
Goodness, truth, and beauty condition our finite, temporal life in such a way that they direct our 
finitude toward the holy source of all things. These transcendentals do not function as abstract 
qualities, or as purely immanent principles, but coalesce in the concrete life of Jesus Christ, who 
makes visible, uniquely and unsubstitutably, the holiness that suspends all things in being—
which is, then, the holiness made open to all human situations.47 The above discussion permits 
several considerations, pertaining to the involvement of holiness with metaphysics and to the 
problematic of holiness’s visibility, which will lead, finally, to the excess of holiness.
To consider the involvement of holiness with metaphysics is to move into a more specula-
tive mode than Williams’ himself generally ventures. However, this speculative mode does not 
abandon the primarily apophatic approach followed above. In attending to the holy, we are in a 
preparatory and tentative position, directed to but never exhausting God’s being. The specula-
tive task, then, draws out aspects of the nature of finite being in its analogical suspension within 
the infinite creative act, but never speculatively encloses the infinite act within which it thinks 
and moves.
One recurring theme has been that finite being bears an inherent instability, particularly per-
taining to its relation to God’s holiness. In one sense, especially concerning being’s goodness 
and the evident patterns of evil, the instability of finite being is a result of humanity’s sinfulness. 
In another sense, though, the instability is simply a condition of finitude, especially as temporal. 
Forming and remembering holiness is a way of taking time with concrete others, the particular-
ities with which and within which one is situated; further, it is to take time with the otherness 
and particularities of one’s own self as the concrescence of this web of particularities acting in 
the present. Consequently, it is not primarily concerned with positing Lockean inert substances, 
discrete and incommunicable. Rather, it involves one in the ongoing, temporal negotiation and 
recognition of essences in-and-beyond existence—or, the excesses of finite surfaces (hence, 
one may allow for a Thomistic understanding of essence as ‘substantial form’, and thereby not 
entirely reject the category of substance through an anachronistic Lockean/Humean reading of 
the metaphysical tradition).48
Forming and sustaining the memory of holy lives is to exist within an analogical tension, 
from and to the holy, transcendent source of all things. It is to receive holiness as a gift to finite 
being, the gift of an ever-greater presence and openness within finite being to infinite being. So 
the instability of existence within the analogical tension from and to holiness is the vulnerability 
of radical dependence, having been granted the time to freely represent and repeat the given 
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excess of being. That creatures are capable of holiness suggests a porosity within finite being; 
for holiness is a leaning into the excess of being, the wild sublime-and-beautiful forms by which 
God calls us to become partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4).49 To be made holy, then, is 
to fulfil one’s nature through anagogically following the (horizontal) in-and-beyond of essence 
into the ever-greater (vertical) in-and-beyond of God’s creative self-bestowal.50 So holiness 
involves one in a reading (anagoge) of the world (attending to the interplay of finite surfaces), 
by which one is addressed by and drawn into the mystery of God.
Which returns to the fore the problematic of the visibility of holiness I introduced initially, 
already suggesting a way of responding. The problem is that if holiness is a name for the being 
who sustains all things and is also communicable to finite being, how do we avoid conceiving 
holiness as so ubiquitous as to be either unremarkable or, on the other hand, absolutely ineffa-
ble in a way that shuts down any attempt to speak of God? Metaphysically, this can be avoided 
simply by affirming, on the one hand, that finite being is not an identical repetition of the divine 
but is rather temporally suspended within a free play of re-presentation and, on the other hand, 
that God is not a discrete entity at a (univocal) distance from the finite being God creates but 
rather is the non-competitive energy permeating and sustaining all. Consequently, given being 
is variously repeated, and so able to bear or occlude divine holiness; and finite being is itself 
a participating mode of re-presenting holiness, and so can give visible expression to holiness 
without pretending to exhaust or even define the divine nature.
And yet more can be said in order to attend to the concrete representation of holiness—and 
here I return explicitly to Rowan Williams—for the Christian commitment to holiness is con-
stituted by the memory and repetition of the story of Jesus as the unsubstitutable visibility of 
holiness, on the one hand, and to continued confrontation with Jesus risen and embodied in his 
church, on the other. As Williams put it recently:
the Christological claim is not that once there was a unique departure from the created norm 
by which God broke through to us, but that once there was a set of historical events, once 
there was an historical body, which fully realised the symbolic vocation of human—and 
finite—being. By being supremely itself as a finite life it embodied the meaning, the form of 
intelligible connectedness, which pervades everything.51
Jesus’ life and death is holiness made concretely visible, and as risen Jesus is the continual 
recasting of creation within the transfiguring light of his holiness, which connects the meta-
physical discussion of ‘excess’ together with God’s involvement in the pain and brokenness of 
creation through Jesus and the church. Because God’s life is an inexhaustible excess, non-com-
petitively shared with the created other, God can risk the cross—becoming vulnerable and pres-
ent to the depths of human suffering and evil—and so God can choose the pained and broken 
for companions:
So our attentiveness is not just … an appreciation of beauty. It is also a willingness to bring 
an active and transfiguring love into this situation of expectancy, to keep company so that an 
action and a relationship may come into being. Being disciples means being in [Jesus’] com-
pany; learning stillness, attentiveness, expectancy; being willing to go where Jesus is going 
and to be in the company of those he’s in company with.52
The contemplative life of holiness is not an ‘inactive’ life characterized by removal from the 
world, rather it is a life drawn into Christ’s self-dispossessing love; it is life lived in a way that 
is only intelligible when seen in the light of Christ.
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So, the life of holiness is superfluous, and as such the holy person/community lives in the 
wake of the abundant superfluity of all being. Holy excess is not the superfluity of irrelevance 
and inconsequence—on the contrary, this is a way of living beyond reduction to utility and 
consumption and so free to be attentive and active beyond necessity. In this light, it is not 
surprising, even if not predictable beforehand, that denominations emerging from the nine-
teenth century holiness revivals—like my own Church of the Nazarene—exhibited an energetic 
engagement with the poor and marginalized.53 To be made holy is to be swept up in a narrative 
movement not in one’s own control, a movement constituted by disponibility to the Spirit and 
confrontation with Christ, especially as Christ addresses us from the excess of the vulnerable 
and victimized.54 And so, finally, to pursue holiness is to pursue the superfluity of unreserved 
giving and eschatologically infinite delight.
The value of Williams’ ‘negative metaphysic’ is that it does not require the speculative move 
of formalizing a metaphysic according to categories and first principles—though neither, I 
would argue, does it exclude this speculative move. If a negative metaphysic is what we cannot 
but do if we are concerned with goodness, truthfulness, and beauty, then any attempt to over-
come Taylor’s buffered self—the self that is isolated in its own interiority and consequently 
attempts to give ‘its own autonomous order to its life’55 (a kind of self that, as we have seen, 
Williams also seeks to problematize)—might be taken as implying a negative metaphysic, even 
if it is only tacit. For overcoming the buffered self cannot be achieved by a simple return to 
a premodern enchanted world but, instead, by a revitalization of the ‘porous self’, a self that 
recognizes its vulnerability and interconnectedness; and it is this porous self that is narrated 
by Williams and discussed above as the kind of self holy communities seek to cultivate and 
remember. Which means that becoming holy, or seeking to recognize and delight in the holiness 
pervading reality, is to become porous to an other outside one’s control, a task that carries with 
it an account or sense of reality-as-such (even when unthematized). So, to pursue holiness is 
also to cultivate the metaphysical imagination, a way of seeing the world as calling for ongoing 
renegotiation and response, eliciting multiple re-presentations, and as confronting one with an 
excess by which more is given than might at first seem.
*******
Holy lives and communities, in conclusion, are properly ‘holy’ as they are involved in a move-
ment to God the creator, the transcendent depth whose self-donation is the act by which all 
finite surfaces move and have being. This movement is an oscillation from a disrupted self or 
community to the stranger, through whom Christ confronts us—an oscillation which takes up 
into itself the movements of self to its world and self to victims and marginalized. Holiness is 
made visible through making transparent the total dependency of created being on God. Which 
is to recognize that finite being is at the same time a play of superficiality and a valid re-presen-
tation of the goodness, truth, and beauty of God. Holiness is not finally found in the securing 
of a place for oneself, but in a movement to the goodness, truth, and beauty in the other—i.e., 
to move in a manner that truthfully re-presents the generative call by which God brings all 
things to existence (anamnesis). Consequently, holiness is to give one’s being to a movement 
by which the Creator-creature relationship is made visible and concrete, and in which the trin-
itarian movement of gift and love is enjoyed; it ‘is growing in understanding of the truth that 
God is three and one, gift and movement in eternal simultaneity—a paradox to the mind that 
wants to own and control but a natural and joyful perception for the mind that through Christ is 
caught up into God’s life.’56
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